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MICKEY, CAN YOU SPARE A DIME?
DISNEYWAR, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND
BUSINESS LAW PEDAGOGY
Kenneth M. Rosen*
DISNEYWAR. By James Stewart. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2005.
Pp. xi, 534. $29.95.
INTRODUCTION
American business executives are under fire. Recent, notorious difficul-
ties at companies such as the Enron Corporation brought attention to these
individuals. Notwithstanding the conclusion of the trials of some of those
top executives,' skepticism remains about the inner workings of U.S. corpo-
rations and the quality of corporate governance.
Drawing special scrutiny from some quarters is the compensation
granted to corporate officers and directors. For instance, the timing of cer-
tain stock option grants, a key component of some compensation packages,
raised ire because of those options' supposed backdating and fortuitous
proximity to increases in share prices.3 Further, some questioned more gen-
erally the high level of executive compensation.4 Such concerns arose at the
same time that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") promulgated new rules related to executive compensation that
* Associate Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law. I thank my colleagues at
the University of Alabama, Dean Ken Randall, and the University of Alabama Law School Founda-
tion for their support of my research. In addition, I appreciate assistance that I received from Bill
Andreen, Carol Rice Andrews, Al Brophy, Pam Bucy, Joseph Colquitt, Alan Durham, Dan Filler,
George Geis, and Bob Kuehn on earlier drafts. I also thank Aaron Shapiro and Eric Rumanek for
excellent research assistance and the editors of the Michigan Law Review for their work on this
essay.
1. See, e.g., Mary Flood et al. Guilty! Guilty! Verdict Will Mean Prison for Ex-Enron Chiefs,
Hous. CHRON., May 25, 2006 (extra edition), at Al.
2. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004).
3. Jeremy Grant, SEC May Clarify Rules on Backdating Stock Options, FIN. TIMES, June 10,
2006, at 9.
4. Diane Brady, No Hair Shirts, But Still .... Bus. WK., May 1, 2006, at 36.
5. E.g., Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
8732A; Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A; Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A; File
No. S7-03-06 (Aug. 29, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006); see also Press Release, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements
Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006) (announcing rule
changes), available at http://www.sec.gov/newslpress/2006/2006-123.html; Executive Compensa-
tion and Related Party Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 8655; Exchange Act Release No.
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6leave some pondering whether additional action is necessary. Ultimately,
issues related to compensation raise a more fundamental question-are di-
rectors and officers running corporations for their own benefit or for the
benefit of shareholders?
Although recent corporate scandals attract special attention to funda-
mental corporate governance issues, long before the recent allegations of
executive excesses, corporate governance controversies arose at one of
America's supposedly most wholesome companies, the Walt Disney Com-
pany. James B. Stewart's 7 DisneyWar describes this strife in the company
that Walt built. Although Stewart's book was written for a wide audience
and has been especially heralded in the business literature,8 legal scholars
similarly should note the work's significance.
DisneyWar tells the story of the corporation during the long tenure of the
company's former chairman and chief executive officer, Michael Eisner. In
studying that tenure, Stewart provides great insight into corporate govern-
ance at the company. He does so through examples of critical events over a
multi-decade time horizon, as Eisner's tenure as CEO lasted from 1984 until
2005.9 For instance, Stewart describes circumstances surrounding the hiring
and termination of a variety of Disney executives and includes details about
those executives' compensation. Importantly, he also describes the role of
shareholders and shareholder rights at the company.
The book not only offers insight into the world of the Hollywood glitte-
rati, but illustrates the significance of a chairman and CEO to the running of
a modem corporation as well as his relationship to shareholders and those
the company employs. Of particular interest in the Disney narrative is the
termination of former Disney executive and supposed Eisner favorite Mi-
chael Ovitz, which offers a primer on management crises and issues related
to executive compensation, including benefits packages and severance
awarded to departing employees. Also fascinating is Stewart's account of the
events surrounding the resignation of Roy Disney, Disney founder Walt Dis-
ney's nephew and former chairman of Walt Disney Animation, from the
company. After resigning his position, Roy Disney helped lead a Disney
shareholder revolt that arguably contributed to Eisner's departure from the
company and that continues to resonate in discussions of corporate govern-
ance reform.
Not surprisingly, the book's tale of recent years at the Walt Disney
Company directly links to a legal narrative. For example, the Ovitz depar-
53,185; Investment Company Act Release No. 27,218; File No. S7-03-06 (Jan. 27, 2006), 71 Fed.
Reg. 6542 (Feb. 8, 2006) (proposing rule changes).
6. E.g. Kara Scannell & Joann S. Lublin, SEC Issues Rules on Executive Pay, Options
Granted, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2006, at Cl (noting "[s]ome groups were hoping the SEC would go
further....").
7. Bloomberg Professor of Business Journalism, Columbia University Graduate School of
Journalism.
8. See, e.g., Ronald Grover, Emperor Eisner, Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 2005, at 24.
9. Bloomberg News, Walt Disney Co.: Eisner Makes Clean Break Resigns from Board of
Directors, CHI. TRB., Oct. 7, 2005, at C2.
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ture underlies years of shareholder derivative litigation that will be familiar
to many corporate law students.' ° And Roy Disney's departure and other
problems at the company became a catalyst for some shareholders' rejection
of the corporate management team through the use of traditional corporate
law mechanisms, such as the annual meeting. Accordingly, in reviewing the
book for this essay, I explain why DisneyWar can be particularly useful for
discussion in business law classes and how the book offers more general
insights into corporate law policy-making.
In Part I, I proffer the significance of an interdisciplinary approach to
business law teaching, especially given the current emphasis on such an ap-
proach in business law scholarship. I observe that interdisciplinary teaching
tools are more effective when those tools utilize the power of narrative to
tell students a comprehensible story about business law issues. Part II ex-
tracts from DisneyWar specific examples that might be used in the
classroom with respect to executive compensation and shareholder rights.
Finally, in Part III, I conclude with an explanation of how the utility of Dis-
neyWar can extend beyond classrooms to assist corporate law scholars and
policy-makers in formulating corporate law policy, particularly in the cur-
rent corporate governance environment.
I. A CASE STUDY OF STUDIED CASES
Effective courses in the business law curriculum must venture beyond
solely teaching legal principles. Many law students possess little experience
with businesses, although their practices after graduation often will focus on
transactions or disputes involving businesses. The business law curriculum
should be transformed to train students better for this type of practice. More
traditional legal education emphasizes the study of court cases, yet absent a
basic sense of how businesses actually function, cases on corporate govern-
ance can be unintelligible for many students. The way to engage students in
discussions of how businesses actually operate is by telling stories about
how real businesses work-and those stories may be found in non-
traditional teaching materials, such as DisneyWar, drawn from the business
arena rather than the legal world.
A. Utilizing the Interdisciplinary Model of Corporate
Law Scholarship in Teaching
One of the defining characteristics of modern corporate law scholarship
is the utilization of an interdisciplinary approach." Numerous scholars are
working vigorously to eliminate barriers between law, business, and eco-
nomics departments at universities. This goes beyond scholars simply
paying lip service to work in other disciplines to include active participation
10. See infra note 31.
11. See Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342
(2005).
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in joint scholarly projects. A casual observation of new articles in academic
journals or working papers on research networks plainly reveals these ef-
forts.12 To facilitate such efforts, professional organizations have arisen to
formalize the relationship between scholars in different disciplines.
Of course, this spirit of cooperation is hardly new. Interdisciplinary re-
search is part of a broader tradition in the legal academy. Indeed, I
previously observed the significance of such research in the development of
the modem system of legal education, particularly as that system prepares
lawyers to be future leaders and agents of social change. 4 The provision of
interdisciplinary materials to business law students is entirely consistent
with this tradition-including the introduction of journalistic-style case
studies of businesses, such as DisneyWar. '
5
Given the general significance of interdisciplinary research to corporate
law, it is particularly important to encourage students at an early stage to
seek out such materials as they approach legal problems. It is insufficient for
professors merely to recite to students the results of empirical research pa-
pers or the contents of other related materials. Those students must
familiarize themselves directly with such materials. When they join the bar,
those same students' personal consultation of these types of materials could
be critical to the provision of effective counsel; indeed, such consultationS • 16
might be viewed philosophically as a professional obligation. This results
from the fact that such materials likely will inform both the creation of new
legal policies and the arguments utilized in the litigation of existing policies
that affect legal clients. Moreover, students sometimes fail to realize that
good business lawyering involves the provision of the type of counsel that
can only be achieved through a deep understanding of clients' business mod-
els. "' Such an understanding requires willingness to study nontraditional and
initially unfamiliar sources of information on businesses. DisneyWar repre-
sents an example of such an information source that, due to its direct,
12. See, e.g., Guolin Jiang et al, Market Manipulation: A Comprehensive Study of Stock
Pools, 77 J. FIN. ECoN. 147 (2005); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Share-
holder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act's Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 773 (2000); Adam Pritchard et al., Do the Merits Mat-
ter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, J.L. EON. & ORG.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=883684.
13. For example, the American Law and Economics Association, founded in 1991 and which
includes practicing lawyers, legal academics, and economists among its membership, "is dedicated
to the advancement of economic understanding of law and related areas of public policy and regula-
tion." Welcome to ALEA, http://www.amlecon.org/assoc.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2006).
14. Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility,
19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 205-10 (2006).
15. See also Brian R. Cheffins, Teaching Corporate Governance, 19 LEGAL STUD. 515, 515-
16, 521-23 (1999) (recommending a combination of academic literature and journalistic items as
teaching materials in arguing for inclusion of corporate governance in the United Kingdom's law
curriculum).
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004) (providing that "lawyer[s] shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowl-
edge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
17. See Jill Schachner Chanen, The Strategic Lawyer, 19 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (2005).
1154 [Vol. 105:1151
Mickey, Can You Spare a Dime?
journalistic style, is accessible even to students without business back-
grounds. 8
B. Stewart's Cast of Characters
Rendering DisneyWar especially accessible is its use of the narrative
form. Stewart essentially weaves his multi-decade description of the Walt
Disney Company's inner workings into a story. The potential benefits from
the use of storytelling and narratives in legal pedagogy are well docu-
mented.' 9
Moreover, the power of narrative as a teaching tool perhaps helps to ex-
plain the long-standing use of the case method in law school. To some
degree cases offer stories from which students can derive legal principles
and ascertain factors that affect the application of the law. Yet as currently
deployed by many law school textbooks, these narratives are arguably
flawed. Typical textbooks contain excerpts from opinions rather than full
judgments and the records that support them. Facts included might be lim-
ited to the legally necessary facts, i.e., those most directly linked to a
holding and arising during a fairly limited time period. Moreover, textbook
authors may abridge cases and the facts contained therein to focus on only
some of the legal issues before a court. In essence, students only get part of
the story from the cases they read. If law schools are interested in training
effective legal counselors, such as transactional lawyers who must craft a
legal structure for a deal, it is important to challenge students to look be-
yond limited legal issues to a bigger, more detailed picture. Business
considerations that are not legally determinative can be practically determi-
native for clients. It is equally important to expand the time horizon of
students' understanding of businesses beyond the limited time period ex-
plored in many cases. Critical to businesses' success-and to lawyers
helping businesses succeed-is the ability to comprehend the effects of im-
mediate-term actions on a long-term business strategy.
Since no one likely would endorse substantial expansion of the length of
existing law school textbooks, the imperfection of case narratives supports
the use of supplemental materials for some cases to assist students with fill-
ing in the blanks and better comprehending principles presented in a case."
18. DisneyWar is far from the only example. See, e.g., BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR,
BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GEN-
IUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000); JAMES B.
STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
19. E.g., Symposium, Pedagogy of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990).
20. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 202 (indicating early use of the case method). Indeed, the
pedagogical use of cases extends to other venues, such as business schools. See infra note 23 and
accompanying text.
21. The proliferation of volumes in the Foundation Press Law Stories series, which offers
background for cases in different subject matter areas, further suggests student demand for
additional details related to case narratives. See http://www.westacademic.com:80/Professors/
FoundationPress/ProductLines.aspx?tab= (follow "Law Stories Series" hyperlink) (last visited
Aug. 17, 2006).
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Interestingly, business professors often employ "case studies" as a peda-
22gogical technique. Law professors might learn from some of the details
selected for inclusion in such business case studies as we seek to supple-
ment facts utilized to study legal cases.2 3 DisneyWar clearly provides a
source for such supplemental information, as is further explained in Part II.
The pedagogical power of the use of individuals in a narrative further
supports education through narrative. In the best stories, character devel-
opment accompanies plot development. DisneyWar is especially useful for
the classroom because of Stewart's careful attention to characters in his nar-
rative, which emphasizes the role of key individuals, particularly Michael
Eisner. Utilizing the principles of representative biography employed by
Ralph Waldo Emerson, I recently related how telling the stories of individu-
als involved with legal issues-including reflection on both the positive and
negative aspects of these persons-is a useful way to teach professional re-
24
sponsibility issues to law students. The stories of those associated with
Disney offer an equally effective way to teach students about business law
issues. In the Emersonian spirit, Stewart describes both the successes and
failures at Disney during Eisner's tenure as chief executive and chairman.
Stewart simultaneously acknowledges Eisner's "extraordinary record of
achievement" (p. 529), while reflecting on Eisner's "management failures"
that Stewart believes
include[d] an inability to delegate, a frequent mistrust of subordinates, im-
pulsive and uncritical judgments, his pitting of one executive against
another, his disrespect for any hierarchy of authority other than his own,
his encouragement of a culture of spying and back-channeling, his fre-
quent failure to acknowledge the achievements of others, and above all, his
inability to groom a successor, notwithstanding his designation of Bob Iger
as his heir apparent.2 5
22. Ann Rippin et al., A Complex Case: Using the Case Study Method to Explore Uncer-
tainty and Ambiguity in Undergraduate Business Education, 7 TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUC. 429
(2002).
23. For instance, the Harvard Business School utilizes a fascinating case study of the deci-
sion by partners at Goldman Sachs to invite partial public ownership of their company through an
initial public offering of securities. Importantly, the case study introduces students to an extended
time horizon for the firm, starting with its origins in the 1800s. It provides details of the firm's
evolving business model, the compensation model related to its prior partnership structure, its gov-
emance under different leaders through various significant events, financial data, and its placement
in the investment banking industry. With this information, students are invited to evaluate the part-
ners' decision to engage in an IPO. See Ashish Nanda, The Goldman Sachs IPO (A), HARV. Bus.
SCH. CASE STUDY, No. 9-800-016, (Sept. 18, 2002).
24. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 220-24.
25. P. 532. Whether one fully agrees with the intensity of Stewart's critique of Eisner is less
significant for this essay's purposes than the fact that, in the hundreds of pages leading up to this
stated conclusion, he reports on positive and negative incidents involving Eisner and others. This
allows readers-including student readers-to draw some of their own conclusions of what works
and is appropriate in the world of business. Of further interest, Iger did ultimately succeed Eisner as
Disney's chief executive officer. See The Walt Disney Company-Management Team,
http://corporate.disney.go.com/corpomte/management-team.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
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Stewart relates the stories of events at Disney with the skill of a Pulitzer
Prize-winning journalist combined with the attention to detail befitting a
former associate of the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore (p. 6).
II. THE LESSON BOOK: DISNEY (BUSINESS) TALES
Given the value of narratives and individual biographies as potential
teaching tools, it is useful to explore some examples of the stories contained
in DisneyWar that not only inform the book's larger narrative, but also po-
tentially inform the study of a variety of business law issues. Such useful
stories, applicable to a wide array of business law courses, occur throughout
the book. For example, students of international business transactions may
enjoy Stewart's detailed accounts of the trials and tribulations related to ex-
panding Disney's business beyond the company's existing domestic theme
parks to include overseas locales like Euro Disney (pp. 126-31, 149). And
students interested in mergers and acquisitions with their fingers on the
pulse of the entertainment industry may appreciate Stewart's stories of Dis-
ney's acquisition of the Weinstein brothers' Miramax Studios and of the
ABC television network (pp. 136-37, 203-09). These stories provide further
insight into the operation of the business judgment rule and risks often un-
dertaken by businesses. The tales illustrate the difficulties of predicting
which entertainment projects should be pursued-not to mention the diffi-
culties of holding management accountable for those predictions, especially
when one compares recent movie and television hits and flops with execu-
tives' expectations before their release to the public (pp. 115, 142, 485-87).
For the purposes of this essay, I will focus on some tales of events and peo-
ple from DisneyWar that relate to the issue of executive compensation and
its link to the business judgment rule as well as to the exercise of share-
holder power. These examples hardly constitute an exhaustive list of events
and people described in DisneyWar that might be used in the classroom;
instead, they exemplify how the book provides insight into many important
corporate governance issues.
A. Judging Businesses, Business Judgment,
and Keeping Quiet as a Mouse
Executive compensation currently draws attention from various quar-
26ters. Examples of purportedly extreme compensation provide tantalizing
material for news stories, but more importantly, can ground shareholder liti-
gation and policy-making initiatives. Accordingly, as future business
counselors, law students benefit from a greater understanding of the pur-
poses of executive compensation and the rules governing it. The events
chronicled in DisneyWar provide great insight into these matters.
In one of the most significant court actions in recent years related to ex-
ecutive compensation, Disney shareholders decried the compensation
26. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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awarded to former Disney president Michael Ovitz upon his departure from
the company. This compensation was noteworthy for its size, valued at
around $130 million, especially given Ovitz's short and arguably unsuccess-
27ful tenure at the company, which saw him serve only fourteen months.
Plaintiffs argued that the grant of such compensation violated the fiduciary
duties of certain Disney directors and officers."
The Disney shareholder litigation stemming from Ovitz's severance
package-litigation that concluded only within the last year-rapidly be-
came a favorite device to teach students about the link between corporate
• 29
governance law and executive compensation. Ovitz's Hollywood back-
ground and rapid rise and fall at Disney make the case especially
entertaining for students. 0 The litigation provides a treasure trove of opin-
ions for a business law course to analyze, from those addressing initial
motions to dismiss the derivative suit, all the way through to the final Dela-
ware Supreme Court opinion, reviewing the Chancery Court judgment
following the actual trial of the case."
The most recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion affirms the Chancery
Court's judgment that the defendant directors did not violate their fiduciary
obligations in approving Ovitz's compensation and in relation to the no-fault
termination that allowed him to secure the benefits of his large severance
32package. Among the issues the Supreme Court considered was the obstacle
posed by the business judgment rule to the plaintiffs' attack on the Disney
directors. The rule in Delaware presumes that:
27. In re Walt Disney Co., No. Civ. A15452, 2006 WL 1562466, at *1 (Del. June 8,2006).
28. Id.
29. Along these lines, the publisher's description of the new fifth edition of the popular
business organizations casebook, Corporations and Other Business Associations, by Charles
O'Kelley and Robert Thompson, specifically emphasizes inclusion of the Disney litigation.
Aspen Publishers, http://www.aspenpublishers.com/Product.asp?catalog%5Fname=Aspen&category
%5Fname=Business+Organizations+%5F%5FBN&product%5Fid=073555790X&Mode=BROWSE&
ProductType=T (last visited August 24, 2006).
30. One can identify but few major players in business organizations cases that merit an
E!Online special report. See Ivor Davis & Sally Ogle Davis, Michael Ovitz, the Thing that Ate Hol-
lywood Is Back to Eat It Again, E!ONLINE, http://www.eonline.com/Features/Specials/Ovitz/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2006).
31. The Delaware Supreme Court summarized the litigation and some of the major opinions
from before the trial and judgment reviewed by the Delaware Supreme Court:
The Court of Chancery dismissed the original complaint in 2000. On appeal, this Court af-
firmed the dismissal in part and reversed it in part, remanding the case to the Court of
Chancery and granting the plaintiffs leave to replead. The plaintiffs filed their second amended
complaint in January 2002, and in May 2003, the Court of Chancery denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss that complaint, ruling that a complete factual record was needed to deter-
mine whether the defendant directors had breached their fiduciary duties. After extensive
discovery Ovitz moved for summary judgment. That motion was granted in part and denied in
part in September 2004. Thereafter, the case was scheduled for trial.
In re Walt Disney Co., No. 411, 2005, 2006 WL 1562466, at *1 n.1 (Del. June 8, 2006) (cita-
tions omitted). The trial court's judgment is available at In re Walt Disney Co., No. Civ. A. 15452,
2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
32. See In re Walt Disney Co., 2006 WL 1562466.
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"in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company." Those presumptions can be re-
butted if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their fiduciary duty
of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the burden then
shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.
The business judgment rule represents a general preference by courts to
avoid second-guessing decisions made by corporation directors. In part this
may reflect recognition of the expertise and information that the directors
possessed in making decisions and a desire to avoid punishment of those
decisions rendered with the unfair advantage of twenty-twenty hindsight.
Moreover, the rule recognizes the primacy of directors in the corporate gov-
ernance power structure 34 and the need to avoid chastening directors into
35
avoiding the risky decisions critical to some businesses' success.
Notwithstanding the benefits of the business judgment rule, it remains
difficult for some students to accept the failure to punish what might be
clearly viewed as bad decisions by directors. Accordingly, some students
might find frustrating the ultimate resolution of the Disney litigation, claim-
ing that it simply was wrong for Eisner and the Disney directors to put
Disney into a situation requiring such a huge payout to Ovitz for so limited
a term of employment. Discussion of background information in DisneyWar
might help students to understand better the difficulty of a court more ag-
gressively intervening in cases such as this one. Moreover, such discussion
might reveal alternative solutions available to students to deal proactively
with such problems after they enter practice.
On the first point, the frustration of students might come from their fo-
cus on the ultimate, disastrous effects of a bad decision rather than on the
lengthier time line that would put the decision into an appropriate context.
In the abstract, the final effects of triggering the termination provisions of
Ovitz's compensation package may be alarming, but DisneyWar documents
that such lavish executive compensation was hardly unique at Disney.
Stewart's multi-decade story of Disney begins to tell the tale of Disney
33. Id. at * 15 (footnotes omitted).
34. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986).
35. Risk-taking naturally accompanies the creativity often critical to corporate success. In-
deed, creativity is so important to businesses that the question of how businesses might
institutionalize creativity has become an important subject for discussion. See Paul B. Brown, The
Elusive Goal of Corporate Creativity, N.Y. TMES, July 2, 2006, Money and Business, at 6.
Success at creative entertainment companies, such as Disney, may hinge particularly on the
public's whims. To remain successful, these companies often must change products and business
models to meet current consumer tastes. Change constitutes risk. Sometimes projects fail, and some-
times they succeed. Certainly, that was the case at Disney under Eisner's leadership. His tenure,
during which he sought bold, creative choices, yielded diverse results for Disney's bottom line. On
Eisner's watch was everything from the problems at Euro Disney to the ushering in of a new wave
of animation through Disney's partnership with Pixar on movies such as Toy Story. Pp. 74, 124,
126-31, 149, 240-41. Even after Eisner's departure, Disney continues to try to recreate itself. See
Sean Smith, The Mice that Roared: How Disney Bosses Bob Iger and Dick Cook Are Redefining the
Kingdom, Hollywood and Themselves, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 2006, at 44.
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compensation back in the 1980s, thus describing the climate in which
Ovitz's generous compensation package, including its immediate vesting of
16stock options upon a no-fault termination, was established (p. 212). Eis-
ner's own interest in the granting of stock options as compensation when he
became Disney's leader in 1984 set the tone long ago for the extensive use
of this type of compensation vehicle at Disney.37 By the 1990s, in one year,
in Stewart's estimation, Eisner's use of stock options and other annual com-
pensation apparently earned him over $200 million, leaving him well ahead
of other corporate executives such as the runner-up earner Sandy Weill, the
chairman of the Travelers Group, who supposedly earned $52.8 million
(p. 124). Although they may not have received Eisner-level compensation,
other Disney executives who preceded Ovitz, such as former president and
chief operating officer Frank Wells, also received generous compensation
that set the bar high for those who followed.3 8 Moreover, as Stewart ex-
plains, Eisner's fondness for options as compensation found support in
contemporary corporate governance theory that sought to better align share-
holder and management interests by structuring management compensation
in a way that provided incentives for managers to take actions aimed to raise
company stock prices (p. 279).
And while his tenure ultimately proved unsuccessful, prior to joining the
company Ovitz was no Hollywood bit player. He needed to be recruited to
Disney. In describing Ovitz's transition to Disney, Stewart's investigation
once again expands the reader's time frame. He notes that much earlier, Eis-
ner and Wells failed to lure Ovitz to Disney when they began their own
tenures with the company, but that Eisner continued to solicit Ovitz's inter-
est in joining Disney (p. 171). Ovitz's own agency business, Creative
Artists, was quite successful, and his business dealings seemed to be ex-
panding as Eisner sought to tempt Ovitz with the advantages of possibly
becoming Disney's president before Ovitz joined the company (pp. 171-73).
Eisner's heart attack added further urgency to the task of finding a succes-
sor.39 Although board members did not know Ovitz well, "his credentials
seemed impeccable. The overriding impression was that he was an effective
businessman with vast creative contacts, 'the most powerful man in Holly-
wood'" (p. 212).
36. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (describing the Ovitz employment agree-
ment).
37. Pp. 54-55 (noting Eisner instructed the lawyer working on his employment agreement,
"I don't care about salary .... Just get me all the stock and options that you can"). Ironically, Eis-
ner's then-friend Ovitz apparently was in the room as Eisner worked with the lawyer on his
compensation package. P. 55.
38. P. 124 (noting that Wells realized $60.3 million, compared to Eisner's $197 million, on a
sale of shares after exercising stock options). Other creative forms of compensation were used at
Disney. One contract clause favoring Disney Studios chair Jeffrey Katzenberg entitled him to a
potentially very lucrative two percent of profits from his Disney projects and ultimately was consid-
ered problematic. Pp. 58, 99-101.
39. P. 194-95. Of course, it is interesting to ponder Ovitz's true negotiating position given his
failure to close a deal to become the chairman of Universal at around the same time. Pp. 199-200.
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Thus, DisneyWar reveals the environment in which the Board acceded to
Ovitz's compensation package, which Eisner stressed needed to be generous
in light of Ovitz's forfeiting his "extremely lucrative position" at Creative
Artists (p. 212). And the Delaware Court had to decide not whether the
compensation scheme was a good one, but, rather, whether it indicated such
bad faith or failure to exercise a duty of care by directors to merit court in-
tervention.
This is not to endorse Disney's compensation scheme or how the com-
pany established Ovitz's pay and severance package. Although Stewart's
narrative suggests circumstances that might have made it more difficult for
the Delaware Court to legally conclude that Disney's directors absolutely
breached a fiduciary obligation, Stewart's story of the adoption of Ovitz's
compensation scheme hardly indicates that Disney utilized a methodology
for determining Ovitz's compensation that was either admirable or worthy
of being employed at other companies.4 However, given courts' reluctance
to interfere with compensation schemes under the business judgment rule,
students and others might do best to focus on DisneyWar's story of Ovitz's
compensation as instructive concerning things a company might not want to
do in hiring executives, setting their compensation, and providing for their
4'possible severance.
In this regard, another aspect of DisneyWar merits attention. Stewart
goes beyond a simple restatement of the terms of Ovitz's employment to
establish the close relationship that existed between Ovitz and Eisner before
Ovitz's arrival at Disney.42 This, in turn, raises questions about the advisabil-
ity of employing family and friends at a company. An important legal
technicality may have lessened emphasis on this issue in the Delaware liti-
gation, as allegations of a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty ultimately
were not part of the case that went to trial.43 However, that does not imply
that lawyers should ignore such relationships when counseling clients. Such
relationships are present at many businesses, and lawyers ignore such rela-
tionships-and their propensity to yield questionable compensation schemes
40. Former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt recently spoke of the tendency to conflate the issue of
the amount of executive compensation with the methodology for determining the appropriate com-
pensation level. He concluded that compensation decisions are important and that it would be useful
to place more emphasis on the methodology used for determining that compensation. Harvey Pitt,
Lessons of the Stock Options Scandal, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at 15. Understanding methodology
likely is more important, because even outside consultants employed to assist with compensation
determinations may not be independent in the fullest sense of the term. See, e.g., Gretchen
Morgenson, Outside Advice on Boss's Pay May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 10, 2006,
atAl.
41. One could drive this point home by asking students how they might advise board mem-
bers and executives to develop compensation packages. This exercise in problem solving could
confirm that students understand pitfalls to avoid in counseling businesses. It also is consistent with
recent moves to introduce additional problem solving into legal pedagogy. See Stephanie Francis
Ward, A Push for Problem Solving, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, May 26, 2006,
http://www.abanet.org/joumal/ereport/my26harvard.html.
42. Stewart further emphasizes the problem of a lack of true independence for certain Disney
executives who also served on the board. Pp. 279-80.
43. In re Walt Disney Co., No. 411,2005,2006 WL 1562466, at *15 (Del. June 8,2006).
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and other problems-at their peril." This also provides an interesting refer-
ence point for classroom discussion about SEC executive compensation
rules. The original proposals to reform regulations related to executive com-
pensation drew heated debate. Notwithstanding criticism of some
suggestions for reform, proposals for changes continued to flow in from a
variety of quarters.46 Even after the SEC's initial adoption of rule changes,
the possibility for additional changes lingered. 47 The rule changes failed to
satisfy all interested parties. s When assessing such proposals, it is useful to
determine how well those proposals address the causes that, in the first in-
stance, led to problems associated with executive compensation.
B. Shareholders (or Creating a Not So Mickey Mouse Owners' Club)
Because the shareholder litigation related to Ovitz's departure is so well
known among students of corporate law, DisneyWar also provides an obvi-
ous avenue to explore more generally in the classroom the nature of
shareholder power. The question of the appropriate level of shareholder su-
pervision of management fuels some of the most interesting and intense
debate over corporate governance rules.49 Following the recent corporate
scandals, discussion intensified over whether shareholders needed to be-
44. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried. Pay Without Performance: Overview of the
Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) (noting their work questioning the characterization of executive
compensation as being achieved by arms-length bargaining).
45. See Rachel McTague, Executive Pay Disclosure Rules Proposed by SEC Draw Criticism,
38 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 609 (2006); see also Executive Compensation and Related Party
Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 8655; Exchange Act Release No. 53,185; Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 27,218; File No. S7-03-06 (Jan. 27, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (Feb. 8, 2006).
Of note, Hollywood was especially vigorous in its criticism as media companies seemed especially
concerned about rules that might expand disclosure of notoriously secret pay of employees who are
not technically top executives. See Matthew Kamitschnnig et al., Studios Are Furious that SEC Is
Curious About Hollywood Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at B1. This seems consistent with the
fact reported by Stewart in his detailed discussion of compensation of various Disney executives that
Jeffrey Katzenberg at one point did not want to become a member of the Disney board so as to avoid
disclosure of his compensation. P. 145. Interestingly, the SEC backed away from some of its original
proposal on nonexecutive compensation when it initially adopted new executive compensation rules.
See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 8732A;
Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A; Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A; File No. S7-
03-06 (Aug. 29, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,181-53,183 (Sept. 8, 2006).
46. See, e.g., Phyllis Plitch & Kaja Whitehouse, Executives' Pay Faces New Tactics, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2006, at B3.
47. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
8732A; Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A; Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A; File
No. S7-03-06 (Aug. 29, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006).
48. See supra note 6; see also Lucian Bebchuk, Investors Must Have Power, Not Just Figures
on Pay, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at 13.
49. Not all welcome increased power. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increas-
ing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006) (contesting the claim that increased
shareholder power necessarily benefits shareholders); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1735 (2006) (responding to Lucian
Bebchuk's proposal to increase shareholder powers); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) (discounting increases to shareholder
power based on benefits of director primacy model).
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come increasingly involved in the management of a corporation. Share-
holder influence on management traditionally is indirect and limited-rather
than directly forcing specific company action, shareholders typically elect
directors to a company's board, and these directors supervise the manage-
ment of the corporation."' This is why corporate law courses consider
whether annual meetings,5 the proxy process,52 and other devices effectively
endow shareholders with a voice in corporate affairs. And similarly, it ex-
plains the debate over whether current policies must be amended.
The debate reflects deeply held philosophical beliefs on how corporations
are most efficiently run.53 Not surprisingly, even long after well publicized,
initial SEC proposals to increase shareholder power through changes to the
proxy solicitation process,54 a route for reform remains unsettled. Because
reforms to the proxy process might effectively redistribute power at corpora-
tions-in a way, depending on one's views, that might be for the better or for
the worse-the interested parties continue to declare loudly their prefer-
ences.55 This is a wonderful topic for discussion in business law classes,
because it challenges students to consider policy reforms, which, if adopted,
could have an enormous effect on their future clients. It also is a topic well
suited for utilizing another aspect of Stewart's Disney narrative-the events
which likely may have led to Eisner's departure from the company.
50. See generally FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 195 (2000).
51. Compare Hoschett v. TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1996) (considering
whether an annual meeting is required to elect directors) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211 (2001)
(contemplating election "by written consent in lieu of an annual meeting").
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n; Solicitation of Proxy Materials, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (2006).
53. Again, as a practical matter, default rules contemplate fairly limited shareholder power-
typically voting rights related to the approval of delineated, extraordinary corporate actions and the
election of directors; access to certain information; and limited rights to bring suit-while leaving
oversight of management to the directors whom shareholders elect. See CLARK, supra note 34, at
93-105.
54. Some limited changes have been made, for instance to the disclosure process related to
proxies. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between
Security Holders and Board of Directors, Securities Act Release No. 8340; Exchange Act Release
No. 48,825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,262; File No. S7-14-03 (Nov. 24, 2003), 68
Fed. Reg. 69,204 (Dec. 11, 2003). However, much of the SEC's proxy reform package remained
unadopted significantly after release of the SEC's initial proposal. See Securities Holder Director
Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626; Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206; File
No. S7-19-03 (Oct. 14, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003) (offering proposed rules in
2003). And after he assumed the SEC chairmanship, Christopher Cox raised additional issues by
placing new emphasis on proxy reform proposals related to issues such as electronic delivery. See
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 52,926; Investment Company
Act Release No. 27,182; File No. S7-10-05 (Dec. 8, 2005), 70 Fed. Reg. 74,598 (Dec. 15, 2005); see
also Rachel McTague, SEC Delays Public Consideration of Proxy Access Issue Until December, 38
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1717 (2006) (noting further delay on consideration of proxy issues and
impact of appellate litigation); Jeremy Grant, SEC Postpones Decision on Company Proxies, FINAN.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at 19 (reporting extension of time to consider proxy issues).
55. The Commission already has received thousands of comments on the shareholder direc-
tor nomination proposal. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations,
File No. S7-19-03, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7l903.shtml (last visited Aug. 18, 2006).
Such intensity of interest in proxy reform amounts to something similar to that in a political cam-
paign.
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These events center around Disney shareholder action inspired, in part,
by Walt Disney's nephew, Roy, who, under uncomfortable circumstances,
resigned from his position at the company after a decades-long tenure. Roy
Disney, who had various sources of power at Disney-he held executive and
board positions at the company, he was one of the largest individual share-
holders, and he possessed the Disney name-was going to be forced to
retire from Disney's board.56 Stewart relates that Roy Disney learned in No-
vember 2003 that he would not be re-nominated as a director,57 but quickly
trumped this coming event by resigning from the board of directors and
from his position as chairman of the company's feature animation division
(pp. 465-69). In a letter to Eisner, he frankly averred that "it is my sincere
belief that it is you [Eisner] who should be leaving and not me" (p. 469).
After his departure, Roy Disney rallied shareholder forces. To this end,
he and Stanley Gold, another dissident who had served on the Disney Board,
started a SaveDisney website to evict Eisner from Disney and used "Howard
Dean's grassroots, Internet-based campaign for the Democratic Presidential
nomination" as their model (p. 493). Their colorful internet efforts eventu-
ally included "streaming audio and video" and "a cartoon showing Eisner
dressed as the evil queen from Snow White" asking, as he stares into the
mirror, "'Who's the greediest of them all?'" (p. 493).
Although the circumstances and corporate law did not permit the Disney
• • 58
shareholders to replace Eisner immediately with their favored individuals,
Stewart expertly relates how the dissidents creatively worked to orchestrate
an embarrassing vote in which shareholders withheld their support for Eis-
ner and other directors "deemed most under his influence." (pp. 493-94).
After the dissidents' campaign began, in the months leading up to this vote,
independent and influential proxy advisory services, who provide suppos-
edly objective advice on how shareholders should vote, began to question
the current management team; within days of Disney and Gold's appearance
at Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") bemoaning Disney's board and
financial performance, that service recommended that shareholders should
vote to "withhold" their confidence in Eisner (pp. 494-502). Of course,
large, institutional investors represented powerful potential allies in the
campaign against Eisner, and Stewart further explains how CalPERS, the
largest pension fund in the United States, and other state pension funds
joined the dissenters (pp. 502-03). Stewart skillfully contrasts the surge of
the dissenters' campaign with efforts of Eisner and his allies to defend the
company and to fight back in the media and elsewhere; Stewart lets the ten-
sion created by the competing efforts build before reporting on the results of
the battle (pp. 493-511). In the end, "43 percent of the shareholders ...
56. Although specified, advanced age triggered Disney's mandatory retirement requirement,
it appears that the policy previously may have been ignored. P. 427.
57. This fact alone indicates that shareholders' power to elect directors may result in less
actual power if the ability to nominate whom they vote for is limited.
58. The campaign began too late for a full proxy contest to replace Eisner and others with a
full slate of alternative candidates. Pp. 493-94.
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withheld their votes from Eisner, and 24 percent from [former Senator and
Disney Board member George] Mitchell" (pp. 510-11). Faced with the re-
suits, Disney's board quickly convened and later issued a press release
stating it had separated the chairman and CEO positions, and had elected
Mitchell to the nonexecutive post; Eisner was no longer chairman.5 9
DisneyWar's narrative on these points is not only theatrical, it is infor-
mative. As classes discuss alterations to shareholder power, they might
consider various questions. One might inquire whether specific changes to
shareholder rights would empower or limit the rights of shareholders like
those at Disney. Also interesting to consider is whether such changes are
necessary in light of the demonstrated ability of Disney shareholders to take
effective action under current corporate law or whether the nature of the
Disney shareholders in this instance (with committed, wealthy, well-
connected leaders and rank-and-file shareholder perhaps particularly con-
cerned about preserving the company's iconic nature) significantly differs
from that of shareholders at other corporations.
The discussion can embrace the fact nicely reflected in DisneyWar that
management interacts differently with distinct subcategories of shareholders
at a single corporation. At times during his tenure, Eisner could be quite
solicitous of some large shareholders, including Roy Disney.60 Such interac-
tions might have been for strategic reasons to help Eisner to achieve or to
consolidate power.6 In many ways, keeping large shareholders happy is
eminently sensible from management's perspective, but it raises the addi-
tional issue in considering reform of shareholder powers of any existing
unequal treatment of different shareholders. Accordingly, students should be
challenged to consider how power differences between shareholders should
shape their opinions of potential reform paths. Indeed, this is a fact that cor-
porate scholars and policy-makers also would do well to consider.
59. Pp. 511-12. Separation of the chairman and chief executive functions has become one
type of change called for by corporate governance reformers. Although not originally as common in
the United States as in England, some believe that such separation may limit problems associated
with placing too much power in the hands of a single individual. See Cynthia A. Williams, Icarus on
Steroids, 94 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1213 & n.76 (2006); see also Christopher J. Christie & Robert M.
Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agree-
ment Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1053 (2006) (noting that the need to open additional information pipelines to
corporate decision-makers beyond the one to the CEO's office reinforced the desire to split the CEO
and chairman positions between two individuals).
60. P. 125 (describing Eisner's credit to Roy Disney for animation success). Indeed, Roy
Disney's involvement in events surrounding the expulsion of Walt Disney's son-in-law from Disney
management, clearing the way for the arrival of Eisner in the 1980s, further indicates how major
shareholders can be allies to some managers and opponents to others in a company's governance.
Pp. 48-55.
61. P. 54 (noting that Eisner even reached out to Walt's side of the family during the events
surrounding the transition to his position of leadership).
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III. TEACHING THE TEACHERS (AND POLICY-MAKERS)
Just as students can learn from DisneyWar, so too can corporate law
scholars and policy-makers. The detailed journalistic investigation that pro-
duced Stewart's case study of Disney should inspire more careful
consideration of the effects of policy proposals at the micro as well as the
macro level. Today's corporate law scholars and policy-makers operate in a
particularly lively regulatory environment. Scandals sparked a spate of rapid
policy-making, including passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,62 that contin-
ues to result in a variety of new regulations. Notwithstanding the headiness
of the regulatory environment, a haze of good intentions should not obscure
the need for careful attention to details and potential costs of additional
regulations.
Scandals and other crises historically have inspired major policy
changes, but recent changes raise significant concerns. Not all of the
63
changes are unabashedly admired. The changes raise fundamental ques-
tions about the traditional allocation of authority between state and federal
regulators in the corporate law arena, as federal action increasingly en-
croaches on the traditional domain of state corporate law policy. One can
agree or disagree with the merits of this reallocation of authority. Regardless
of one's position, however, it is important to note the ironic nature of some
of the new federal regulation. As new federal regulations proliferate, some
discretion for existing federal regulatory agencies-for example, the discre-
tion to adjust regulations to address problems that the regulations create-
appears to be in decline.
A close examination of aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 64 illustrates
this phenomenon. In particular, the legislation expands the role of the SEC
in regulating corporate governance while decreasing the agency's discretion
to select the best means to do so or to provide regulatory relief as needed.
Where previous legislation increasing SEC authority often granted the
Commission exemptive or rulemaking authority without prescribing the
content of rules,65 newer legislative initiatives not only require the SEC to
62. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
63. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); see also Jeremy Grant, Sarbanes-Oxley Means 'Huge
Leak'for US Capital Markets, FIN. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at 13.
64. 116 Stat. 745.
65. For example, the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 responded to a variety of prob-
lems in the nation's securities markets by granting the Commission broad authority to promulgate
rules to effectuate changes. In Section 11 (a), the amended Securities Exchange Act of 1934 granted
the Commission authority to take the steps it saw fit to create a national market system as long as
those actions were consistent with general objectives noted in the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-I
(2000); see also Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-
Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17 (1986) (noting changes brought about over time to the
over-the-counter market following the 1975 amendments). More recently, Congress gave the SEC
broad authority "to conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or
any class or classes of persons from any provision of the Securities Act." 1 Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 225 (1998).
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engage in subsequent rulemaking, but also delineate the contents of the rules
to be promulgated.
Professor Jill Fisch and I analyzed the shortcomings of a statutory provi-
sion taking such an approach when we critiqued Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.6 That statutory provision required the SEC to promul-
gate rules of conduct for attorneys and mandated specific content: obligatory
reporting provisions to include in the rules.67 This resulted in the SEC's
adoption of the so-called Part 205 rules. 6' Notwithstanding the good inten-
tions of legislators drafting provisions such as Section 307 or the laudability
of their goals, such heavy-handed mandates, hastily crafted in the crucible
of scandal, exacerbate the problems of ill-considered policy decisions.
Rather than allowing implementing regulators to consider more fully the
implications of such regulation and to adjust rules to account for those im-
plications after statutes are enacted, these legislative mandates further
69
enshrine any shortcomings of the initial policy choice.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding growing criticism of recent regulatory
initiatives, additional scandals, such as the recent ones involving backdating
of stock options, make it less likely that the current pace of policy-making
will slow. If that is the case, it becomes more important for scholars and
policy-makers to consider at the outset not only the general benefits they
hope to achieve with new policies, but the likely effect of those policies on
individual business entities. One way to do this is to hypothesize how new
policies might affect individual entities based on realistic descriptions of
how those entities work in case studies such as DisneyWar.
Moreover, in addition to general insights that it provides about corporate
governance, some of the greatest revelations of DisneyWar are about how
eclectic and quirky a corporation can be. By personalizing his narrative to
show how individuals, and their personal nature, drove so much of Disney's
operations, Stewart provides reason for policy-makers to take pause. They
66. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future
Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003).
67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307.
68. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8185; Exchange Act Release No. 47,276; Investment Company Release No. 25,919; File
No. S7-45-02 (Jan. 29, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003).
69. More recently, section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act raised its own issues related to the
breadth of SEC authority. Some suggested that the Commission confer exemptive relief to certain
small businesses affected by the provision. The Commission ultimately chose not to do so. Steven
Marcy, SEC Promises More Section 404 Guidance but Rejects Exemption for Small Companies, 38
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 901 (2006). This was after some claimed the SEC had no power to ex-
empt firms from the provision. See, e.g., Rachel McTague, AFL-CIO: SEC Has No Power to Exempt
Firms from SOX Internal Controls Provision, 38 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 101 (2006). The issue is
sufficiently controversial that some in Congress seek to step into the fray again by passing addi-
tional legislation exempting small firms. See Rachel McTague, Feeney, DeMint Introduce Bills to
Exempt Smaller Firms from SOX 404, 38 BNA SEC. REG. & L. RPT 902 (2006); Elana Schor, Bipar-
tisan Support Secured for Sarbanes-Oxley Exemptions, THE HILL, May 8, 2006, at 4.
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should be cautious about imposing permanent, one-size-fits-all solutions in
an economy that relies on unique companies whose success may be a result
of their quirkiness.
We also should not fall into the trap often encountered by the law stu-
dent whose understanding of corporate law issues is constrained by
knowledge of a single court opinion looking at the operations of a business
in a limited time period. Like students, scholars and policy-makers must
expand their time frame when considering the effects of new policies. And
like James Stewart, they must be willing to investigate, including, in the
case of policy-makers, through direct communication with individuals at the
business entities that they regulate, to better identify concerns. If, in addition
to providing a teaching tool for the education of future policy-makers,
James Stewart's excellent DisneyWar also inspires scholars and current pol-
icy-makers to understand more fully the inner workings of the companies
that they regulate, then the book's impact will be truly noteworthy.
70. See Pitt, supra note 40 (noting hazards posed by the recent options scandal to reform of
Sarbanes-Oxley regulations and the "need to refine [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and that] at a mini-
mum, its one-size-fits-all philosophy should be changed").
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